Punitive Damages by Smith, Lewis Lawrence
TIE
AMERICAN LAW REGISTER
AND
REVIEW.
JUNE, 1893.
PUNITIVE DAMAGES.
By Luwis LAWRENCE SmiTH.
THE damages intended to be described in this article
are variously styled punitive, exemplary or vindictive; but
either of the first two of these titles is pieferable to the
third, for the reason that such damages are allowed as a
punishment to the defendant, or to make an example of
him, rather than as a measure of revenge of the jury inflict-
ing them. The doctrine allowing such damages is an old
one, and as illogical and as inconsistent with other and
more fundamental principles of law as its age is venerable;
nevertheless, it is accepted in most of those jurisdictions to
which we turn for the best exposition of the law. At the
same time, more than one able jurist has set the stamp of
his disapproval on a practice which he has found himself
unable to reconcile with the broader principles that every
lawyer is educated to accept with respect. The answer to
the doctrine, however, is not to be based on attempts to
show that the court meant something else when they
apparently allowed it to prevail, such as were made by
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Professor Greenleaf; I for- it is an unquestionable fact in
the Reports.. Its nature furnishes its best refutation.
'Punitive damages, then, are such as are given in civil
actions, for torts committed with wilfulne s, wantonness,
gross negligence or malice; and wantonness and wilfulness
may be assumed to include such forns of intentional acts
as arouse in a properly constituted breast sentiments of
horror, disgust or detestation. -Seduction, assault, oppres-
sion and gross insult maybe taken as examples. These
acts may be positive crimes or mere'ethical offences for
which the legislature has not imposed a criminal penalty.
As-to the former, a civil jury is not only allowed, but may
-be called upon to impose a penalty vastly in excess of
many of the pecuniary penalties inflicted by-the Criminal
Code; .and the unfortunate defendait is not only not per-
mitted to ask to have this anomalous crime for such it
amounts to, proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but is
denied. many other rights accorded to the lowest criminal.
Men are sometimes wilful, wanton, negligent or malicious,
'but ordinary humanity forbids .society to judge or to-punish
them except under forms of law established as the result of
its most .enlightened thought. The doctrine of punitive
damages allows this. and more. Not only does it allow the
punishment of such a defendant as a criminal in a civil
suit, without according him the benefit of a criminal's
defense, but it also -relegates to the passions of a jury,
inflamed by all the eloquence of a man skilled in bending
those passions to his will, ihe question of determining the
amount -of punishment to be inflicted. The idea of with-
drawing the duty of determining sentences from the trial
judge is not a new one, but its most earnest advocates have
not suggested that it be transferred to the peers of an ordinary
criminal at the close of a trial; aid yet that 'is what is
done in the case of punitive damages. Again, the essential
idea of such damages being punitive, why is the jury not
instructed to separate the damages, and give only the com-
pensatory part to the plaintiff and the balance to the
IEvidence, Vol. II, 253, n.
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,county?1  The plaintiff is surely not entitled to them.
Given a doctrine with anomalous qualities, it is mot sur-
prising that it has been described.as "a sort of hybrid be-
tween a display of ethical indignation and the imposition of
a criminal fine.' 2
The weaknesses of the theory of punitive damages are
stated, after an exhaustive review of the authorities, by.
judge FOSTER, of New Hampshire, with great clearness
and candor, perhaps with a little of the energy of a
proselyte, for an opinion of his Court, delivered some
twenty volumes previously, had been taken as a bulwark
.of the defenders of the doctrine. In Fay v. Parker,3 he
.says: "The true rule, simple and just, is to keep the civil
and criminal process and practice distinct and separate.
Let the criminal law deal with the criminal, and administer.
-punishment for the legitimate purpose and end of punish-
ment, namely, the reformation of the offender and the
.safety of the people. Let the individual whose right is
infringed and who has suffered injury, go to the civil courts
and there obtain full and ample reparation and compensa-
tion, but let him not there obtain the ' fruits' to which-
-he is not entitled, and which belong to others. Why
tolerate longer a false doctrine which, in its 'practical
-exemplification, deprives a defendant of his constitutional
right of indictment or complaint on oath before being
.called into court; deprives him of the right of meeting the
-witnesses against him face to face; deprives him of the
tight of not being compelled to testify against himself;
,deprives him of the right of being acquitted, unless the
proof of his offence is established beyond a reasonable doubt;
deprives him of the right of not being punished twice for
the same offence? Punitive damages destroy every consti-
tutional safeguared within their reach. And what is to be
gained by this annihilation and obliteration of fundamental
1 The damages are required to be _ziarated in some jurisdictions,
Eviston v. Cramer, et al., 57 Wi".. 570; P.vleld v. F .!field, 75 Ia., 435,
'but the plaintiff gets both parts.
2 Haines v. Schultz, 5o N. J. L., 484.
353 N. H., 342.
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aw? The sole object in its practical results seems t9 be
co give a plaintiff something which he does not claim in
his declaration. If justice to the plaintiff required the
destruction of the constitution, there would be some pre-
text for wishing the constitution destroyed. But why
demolish the plainest guaranties of that instrument, and
explode the very foundation upon which the constitutional
guaranties are based, and for no other purpose than to
perpetuate false theories and develop unwholesome fruits?
Undoubtedly this-pernicious doctrine has become so fixed
in the law, to repeat the language of Judge CAMPBELL, of
Michigan, 'that it may be d~ficult to get rid of it.' But
it is the business of courts. to deal with difficulties, and this
heresy should be taken in hand withput favor, firmly and
fearlessly."
The reply to such attacks is by way of confessioi and
avoidance, namely, that although the theory has its veak-
nqsses, yet society demands the punishment of inalefactors.
The -reply i§ true enough, but society has established
tribunals especially for that purpose.
Punitive damages must be clearly distinguished from
compensatory damages in which indeterminate elements
may exisf. In the former the jury are directed that they
may, in a proper case, go as fdr beyond compensation as.
* their ,consciences will permit, and punish the defendant for
his wicked intentions, so that others of his kind may be
deterred from similar acts.(thus touching the keynote of
crimnal punishment); in the latter they have nothing to
do with the intention itself, but base their verdict on the
1effect of the intention, that is, on the injury done the
plaintiff.
That this oftentimes involves elements of great uncer-
tainty, for the measurement of which no suitable yard-stick
can perhaps be found, and that the estimation of such ele-
ments frequently involves, in the mind of-a juryman, some-
thixig that is punitory, is true; but the distinction between
compensation to the plaintiff and punishment to the-defend-
ant is a practical one, and has an important bearing on the
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size of the verdict. These uncertain elements are such as
mental and physical suffering and loss of earning capacity
and reputation, and have no correlative in money values.
So long as the distinction between punitive and corn-
pensatory damages is understood to be the difference be-
tween punishment for evil intentions and compensation for
the results of those intentions, it is an almost unvarying,
one. In some few jurisdictions, however, expressions have
been used which would seem to concede the propriety of.
permitting the jury to consider the evil.intent, that is, the
quality of the act, as a source of aggravation to the plain-
tiff. Thus, in Massachusetts, it was held that in an action
for a wilful injury to the person, the manner and manifest
motive of the wrongful act might be given in evidence as
affecting the question of damages; for when the merely'
physical injury is the same, it may be more aggravated in'
its effects upon the mind if it is done in wanton disregard
of the rights and feelings of the plaintiff, than if it is the,
result of mere carelessness; but the wantonness must be
such as to cause additional suffering.' The same position
is clearly set forth in an able dissenting opinion in a case in
Pennsylvania, where the doctrine of punitive damages
seems to be regarded by the Court with mingled suspicions
of its worth, and reverence for its ancient origin.' The
point, however, is not a clear one, and does not prevail
- generally.
Whatever may be the propriety of allowing punitive
damages at all, it is a fact,, which cannot be successfully
controverted, that in all but a very few jurisdictions in the
United States such damages are recoverable, in a proper
case, against the wrong-doer himself, although some States,
like Tennessee and Pennsylvania, seem restive under the
rule.
3
The doctrine of. punitive damages has flourished as
long as it has been confined to actions against the person
IHawes v. Knowles, 14 Mass., 518.
2Cornelius v. Hambay, 15o Pa. St., 359.
3 Cox v. Crumley, 5 Lea, 529; Cornelius v. Hambay, supra.
521.
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guilty of the wilffiness, wantonness, gross negligence, or
malice-those in which the legal positions of the parties
have jbeen so proximate and the offense so immediately
present to the Court, that its sense of constitutional
rights and guaranties has. been blunted by its desire to
emphasize the abhorrence with which the offense was
regarded by society. Great difficulty was naturally felt,
however, in applying the doctrine to cases of wrong per-
petrated by servants acting in the line of their employ-
ment.. Should masters be held liable for the wicked inten-
tions of their employees ? As has been stated already,
it is the intention which is. the basis of punishment,
and it makes little difference, so far as this phase of
,- the question is concerned, whether the act results. from an
actual intent, or because it is done under c-ircumitances in
which it will probably cause some harm which the law
seeks to prevent.' Notwithstanding the enormous logical
difficulty of holding a master liable for acts which he could
neither have intended nor foreseen, an astonishingly large
nuiber of courts have succeeded in overcoming it. The
demagogic argument of punishing somebody because a
-wrong has been done has been borrowed from the plaintifi's
attorney and incorporated into the solemn decision of the
judge. One might well suppose it to be sufficient to state
the basis of the doctrine of punitive damages to make it
impossible to punish an innocent master for his servant's
wrong, but it has not been'so.
The liability of a master for compensatory damages
for the act of his servant rests on an entirely'different
basis. There is no question, in such a case, of intent. In
the execution of his duties the servant acts for his master;
they are to that extent one person, and if for no other
reason, the rule that where, one of two innocent persons
must suffer, the one who has made it possible for the wrong
to occur must bear the loss, would require the master to,
make the injured party whole. How entirely different that
is from the case of punishing the master for an intention
I Holmes on The Common Law, p. 75.
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which he did not have, in order to pay to a man money
which he does not claim, must be apparent.
The States which have been most responsible for this
extended application of the doctrine of punitive damages
are Maine, Pennsylvania, Ohio, New Hampshire (where it
is now abandoned), Mississippi and Maryland. A decision
of the United States Supreme Court has also been errone-
ously supposed to uphold the doctrine. In Goddard v. The
Grand Trunk Ry.,' a passenger was assaulted by a brake-
man. In deciding the case, the Court said: "A corpora-
tion is an imaginary being. It has no mind but the mind
of its servants, it has no voice but that of its servants, and
it has no hands with which to act but the hands of its ser-
vants. All attempts to distinguish between the guilt of
the servant and that of the corporation, or the malice of
the servant and the malice of the corporation, or the pun-
ishment of the servant and the punishment of the corpora-
tion, are sheer nonsense. Neither guilt, malice
nor suffering is predicable of this ideal existence called a
corporation." The remedy, it was added, was that the
corporation should select careful agents. A forceful dis-
senting opinion was filed. That a corporation has a mind
distinct from its hands in just as real a sense as it has an
existence was not thought possible. The functions of the
corporate mind are executive; of its hands, ministerial.'
If careful agents are to be selected, who selects them? On
the theory of that case they would select themselves.
In Pennsylvania, until within a very recent period, the
"heresy " of Judge FOSTER has been held as the straitest
orthodoxy. From the time of Hazard v. Israel,' in which
that eminent jurist, Chief Justice TILGHMAN; held that a
sheriff was liable in punitive damages for the wanton
wrong of his deputy, almost to the present time, the doc-
trine has been practically unquestioned. In Lake Shore
& Mich. So. Ry. Co. v.' Rosenzweig,4 the defendant cor-
157 Me., 202 (1869).
2 R. R. v. Prentice, 147 U. S., 101-114.
3 1 Binn., 240.
4 11 3 Pa. St., 519.
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.porationwas l5unished to the extent of $48,75o because a
conductor had insisted on a passenger leaving .the train on
a dark night, although the latter offered to pay -what addi-
tional fare should be proper. The only authority cited,
* curiously enough, is Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry.. Co. v.
-Armes,' in which punitive damages were refused. In Cor-
fielius v. Hambay,2 the jury was instructed that it might
find damages (a) to make compensation to theplaintiff for
the injury he had sustained; (b) to deter the defendant
fromcommitting the like crime in time to-come; (c) to-
deter. other persons from 'committing the same crime;
(d) to punish the defendant for the crime. The majority.
of the Court affirmed this direction. Justices WILIAMS
and GRuEN dissented, however, and the forier filed an
able opinion showing the impropriety of allowing punitive
'damages even as against a wrong-doer. This leaven,
toget4er with the recent demonstration that the one
authority cited does not decide 4ihat the learned Court
supposed,' may be regarded, perhaps, as an indication "of.
clange of heart on the question.
In Atlantic & Great Western Ry. Co. v. Dunn,4 puni-
' tive damages were allowed against a railroad company
because one of its passengers had been ejected by a train
official. The Court said: "-A corporation may 'be sub-
jected to exemplary damages for torts of its servants in all
cases where natural persons, acting for themselves, if guilty
of like tortious acts, would be liable to such damages,"
* and held that the legal unity of master and servant re-
quired that rule. The opinion rests on the case'of P., W.
& B. R. R. Co. v. Quigley,' where the tortious act com-
plained of was directed by the railroad at a. corporate
meeting.
One of the most remarkable cases of the application
1 9I U. S., 489.
2 150 Pa. St., 359.
SR. R. v. Prentice, 147 U. S., 101-114.
ig Ohio, 162 (1869).
5 21 How., 202.
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of the doctrine of punitive damages is to be found in N. 0.,
J. &. G. N. R: R. Co. v. Hurst,' where a gentleman was
carried some distance beyond his station and put down
without violence on the side of the track. He suffered
scarcely any actual damages, even of the most indeter-
minate sort, but a verdict of punishment for $4500 was
allowed to stand. The absurdity of the thing struck the
Court, but could not swerve it from its preconceived idea.
There are, of course, many other cases throughout the
country where this doctrine has been upheld, and a refer-
ence to the more important of them will be found in a note.'
In addition to the few States where the doctrine of
punitive damages has never been accepted, or has been
repudiated,' a large number of jurisdictions have declined
to extend its anomalies to cases where masters are sought
to be reached through the in.tentional wrongs of their ser-
vants, .and that whether the masters are corporations or
private individuals.4. The exemption from such liability,
1.36 Miss., 66o (1859).
2 R. R. Co. v. Larkin, 47 Md., 155; R. R. Co. v. Rector, 104 Ill., 296;
Singer Mfg. Co. v. Holdfort, 86 Ill., 455; bift see Rosencrans v. Barker,
115 Ill., 331, and Chicago v. Kelly, 69 Ill., 475; R. R. Co. v. Rogers, 38
Ind., 116; Williamson v. Storage Co., 24 Iowa, 171; Higgins v. R. R. Co.,
64 Miss., 8o; R. R. Co. v. Steele, 42 Ark., 2I; Ga. R. R. Co. v. Olds, 77
Ga., 673; 'Wheeler & Wilson Mfg. Co. v. Boyce, 36 Kan., 350; R. R. Co"
v. Ballard, 85 Ky., 307; but see R. R. Co. v. Dills, 4 Bush, 593; Travers v.
R. R. Co., 63 Mo., 421; Knowles v. R. R. Co., 102 N. C., 59; quinl V. R. R.
,CO., 29 S. C., 381; R. R. Co. v. Garret, 8 Lea, 438; R. R. Co. v. Guinan,
ii Lea, 98; Murphy v. R, R. Co., 29 Conn., 499.
3 Barnard v. Poor, 21 Pick., 378 ; Lothrop v'. Adams, 133 Mass., 471;
Hawes v. Knowles, 114 Mass., 518; Beck v. Thompson, 31 W. Va., 459;
Stilson v. Gibbs, 53 Mich., 28o (COOLEY, C. 'J.); Wilson v. Bowen, 64
Mich., 133; Fay v. Parker, 53 N. H., 342; Riewe v. McCormick, ii Neb.-
a 6 i; R. R. Co. v. Yeager, i1 Cal., 345 (changed by Code, St. Ores v.
McGlashen, 74 Cal., 148).
4 R. R. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U. S., 1OI; Kirksey v. Jones, 7 Ala., 629;
Bank v. Jefferies, 73 Ala., 183; Cleghorn v. N. Y. C. & H. R. R. R. Co.,
56 N. Y., 44; Hagan v. Prov. W. R. R. Co., 3 R. I., 88; Staples z.
Schmid, 26 Atl. Rep., 193 (R. I.); Boulard v. Calhoun, 13 La. Ann., 445;
Eviston v. Cramer, et al., 57 Wis., 570; Haines 1'. Schultz, 50 N. J. L.,
481; Sullivan v. R. R. Co., 12 Ore., 392; Clark v. Newsham, i Exch.,
13I ; R. R. Co. v. Garcia, 70 Tex., 20 7 ; Wardrobe v. Storage Co., 7 Cal.,
1I8; McCoy v. R. R. Co., 5 Houst., 599.
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however, as the logic of the; case demands, extends only to
masters who are. innocent of any. evil intention,' either
actual or arising from necessary implicatiof. Th.e position
is well stated 14y CHURCH, C. J., in Cleghorn v. N. Y. C. &.
H.R. R. R. Co.' "CFor injuries," he says, "by the negli-
gefnce of a servant while engaged in. the business 6f the-
master within the scope of his employment, the latter is.
liable for compensatory damages; but -for such negligence,
however gross or culpable, he is not liable to'be punished'
in punitive damages unless he is also chargeable with.
gross misconduct. Such misconduct may be established by
,showing that the act of the servant was authorized or rati-
fled, or that the master employed or retained the servant
knowing- that he.was incompetent, or from bad'habits unfit
for the position he occupied. Some thing more than ordi-.
nary negligence is requisite; it-must le reckless and of a.
criminal nature, and clearly established. Corporations may-
, incur the liability as well as private persons.' If a rallroadc
conipany, for instance, employs a drunken, engineer or
switchman" or retains one after knowledge of his habits.
' is clearly brought home to the company or to asuperintend-
, ing agint authorized to employ and discharge him, and an
injury occurs by reason of such habits,. the company may-
, and ought to be amenable to the severest rule of damages.
but I am not aware of any principle which permits a jury
to award exemplary.damages in a case which does not come.
up to this standard, or to graduate the amount of such
damages by their views of the propriety of the conduct of-
the defendant, unless such conduct is of the charafter before-
specified." It will be observed that, by conduct "reckless
and of a crinlinal nature," is meant the conduct of the-
corporation or of an executive branch of it, as distinguished
from similar conduct of a subordinate agent. Thus the-
corporation may be guilty of such conduct when, at a cor-
porate meeting, it directs the publication of a libel;' or
where its executive officers take part in an assault.3 Under
156 N. Y.. 44.
2 R. R. Co. v. Quigley, 21 How., 202.
3 R. R. Co. v. Harris, 122 U. S., 597.
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the opposite rule, inasmuch As the innocent master is
punished for the good of society, and he i a member of'
that same society, he, is made to undergo a sort of martyr-
dom for his own benefit.'
the advocates of the doctrine of punitive damages,
as extended to innocent masters, have hitherto derived
some solace from the decisions of the Vnited States Supreme
Court in the Quigley and Arnes cases, based on an appar-
- ently erroneous conception of the principles which under-
lay them. Whatever doubts, however, there may have been.
on the subject have been quieted by Mr. Justice GRAY, in a.
most masterly opinion rendered in The Lake Shore & Mich..
So. Ry. Co. v. Prentice,2 in which the defendant corporation
had the long-deferred satisfaction of obtaining a decision at
direct variance with that by which it suffered so severely in.
the Rosenzweig case.3 The plaintiff appears to have been
veiy badly used. The Circuit Court .of Illinois charged the
jury among other things: "After agreeing upon the
amount which will fairly compensate the plaintiff for his
outlay and injured feelings, you may add something by way
of punitive damages against the defendant, which is some-
times called smart money, if you are satisfied that the con-
ductor's conduct was illegal (and it was illegal), wanton and,
oppressive. How much that shall be the Court cannot tell
you. You must act as reasonable men, and not indulge,
vindictive feelings toward the defendant." The jury found
SO5ooo.
Mr. Justice GRAY, after stating that the question, like
others affecting the liability of a railroad corporation as a
common carrier, was one of general jurisprudence, not of.
local law, and that, therefore, the -Court would, in the
absence of express statute, exercise its own judgment in
the matter, proceeded with a critical discussion of the
authorities. He admitted the doctrine that punitive
damages were recoverable against a defendant wrong-doer,
'Hagan v. R. R. Co., 3 R. I., 88.
2 147 U. S., Ior.
3 113 Pa. St, 5ig.
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but that fromh the decision. in "The Amiable Nancy,"', they
had never been, allowed in that Court against a master who
was innocent of ill intention, or who had never approved
the vrongfut act of his servant, and that in this respect
there was no difference between corporations and individ-
-uals. "No doubt,,' he said, "a corporation, likd a natural
person, may be held liable in exemplary or punitive dam-
-ages for the act of An agent within the scope of his employ-
ment, provided the criminal intent necessary to warrant the
ii mosition of such damages is broughi home.to the corpora-
tion.2  But the question before the Court, on which its
-decision is unequivocal, is that such -damages .are not
:allowed against the master-where there is no evideice to
show that he knew his servant to be .an unsfiitable person,
or that he in any way participated 'in, ltpproved or ratified
the act of the servant.
The most approved positions, therefore, "on the question
of punitive damages, would seem to be, as follows :
(i) Punitive damages, however objectionable in theory,
lhay be recovered where the defend~mt himself is guilty of
wilfulness, wantonness, malice or gross -negligence.
'(2) Where such defendant is a corporation, the act
.complained of must be the act of the corporation, not of its
subordinate agent.
(3) Such damages may not be recovered against a-
master, whether corporate or individual, unless he has
-recklessly employed improper servants, or has approved or.
-ratified the wrongful act.
While it is true that a decision of the Uflited States
Supreme Court is not binding oni the State Courts, and is,
perhaps, not so persuasive on this subject as on a question
of commercial law, yet it is entitled to the utmost respect
alike from the jfersonnel of the Court and the studious care,
:with which its decisions are prepared, and should pave the
way for the harmonizing of the law of this much-disputed
question.
PHIr.ADxLPHIA, May, 1893.-
3 Wheat., 546.
Bell v. Midland Ry. Co., xo C. B. N. S., 287.
